Game theory doesn't have anything directly to do with the political/military gaming this blog is about, but it's a useful tool in conceptualizing strategic interaction, which can come in very handy. Academic Earth has posted video of the lectures from two different elementary game theory courses, one from Yale, the other from Berkeley. The Berkeley course only has one lecture posted so far, but the Yale course appears to be complete. However, the Berkeley course offers something unique: it is the first class to be taught from the perspective of the video game Starcraft. The strategic interaction within the game forms the basis for the course's explanations of the basics of game theory, and familiarity with the game is highly recommended for students taking the class. I'm not sufficiently familiar with Starcraft to fully appreciate this, but it's a fascinating concept. The class website is here, with more information. It's enough to make me consider trying to hunt down a copy of the game.
For a more complete explanation of the difference between gaming and game theory and an example of how game theory and gaming together can complement each other as analytic tools, see the section of this post describing an article by Paul Bracken that utilizes both.
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
Sigma I-64 and Sigma II-64: gaming Vietnam
In 1964 the JCS hosted two particularly interesting wargames, Sigma I-64 and Sigma II-64. The Sigma wargames were designed to consider the issues surrounding the escalation of U.S. commitment in Vietnam. H.R. McMaster's article in the current issue of World Affairs mentions these games in the context of what they revealed about the weakness of "Graduated Pressure," a strategy of carefully calibrated use of force meant to efficiently change the behavior of the adversary:
(Thomas Allen's 1987 book, War Games, has a chapter on the Sigma games (pp. 193-208). See also Harold Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968, pages 57, 58, and 67.)
The failure of Graduated Pressure was foretold even before it was implemented. In 1964, two eerily prophetic Pentagon war games exposed fatal flaws in the strategy. In those war games, Southeast Asia experts played the role of the North Vietnamese government. In response to limited bombing designed to signal American resolve, those experts decided to infiltrate large numbers of North Vietnamese Army soldiers into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. This, in turn, impelled the commitment of American troops to the South. The war games concluded that the combination of enemy sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the enemy’s ability to sustain itself on meager provisions, its strategy of emphasizing political and military actions to avoid strength and attack weakness, and limitations on the application of American military power, would mire the United States in a protracted conflict with little hope for success. The game ended after five years of fighting with five hundred thousand troops committed in South Vietnam. Bundy, however, found the conclusion to be “too harsh.” Rather than force a reexamination of strategy, the results of the SIGMA I and SIGMA II war games appear, in retrospect, as a roadmap that civilian and military leaders followed along the path to failure in Vietnam.McMaster goes on to note that "The SIGMA war games had no effect on American policy or strategy in Vietnam." Why is that? On the surface, the games were extremely well positioned to have a major impact. Certainly, there was a need for sober reexamination of the underlying assumptions of U.S. strategy. Harold Ford cited a CIA officer’s comment on Sigma I-64:
“Widespread at the war games were facile assumptions that attacks against the North would weaken DRV capability to support the war in South Vietnam, and that such attacks would cause the DRV leadership to call off the VC. Both assumptions are highly dubious, given the nature of the VC war.”Gaming with a broad cross-section of participants can serve to identify and challenge the assumptions they bring with them, and in this case there were participants in the Sigma games that did not share the predominant view of the conflict. Sigma I-64 was played by “working level CIA, State, and military officers.” Sigma II-64 also involved high-level policy officials, including National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, DCI John McCone, General Curtis LeMay, General Earle Wheeler, and A/S Defense John McNaughton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Deputy CNO Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr., A/S State William Bundy, and CIA deputy director for intelligence Ray Cline. This is an exceptionally high-level group to find participating in a wargame, but it does not appear that the Sigma wargames of 1964 had any direct impact on policy, despite their dire warnings about the potential consequences of U.S. actions and despite the participation of numerous military and civilian national security leaders. Without a willingness to be persuaded on the part of decision-makers, the games could not make a policy impact. While the results of Sigma I and II were uncannily prescient, the failure of participants to take the results seriously is not the most significant issue; policy-makers are right to be skeptical of a game's predictive value. But by failing to move policy-makers to reexamine their assumptions from a fresh perspective, the Sigma games represent a colossal missed opportunity.
(Thomas Allen's 1987 book, War Games, has a chapter on the Sigma games (pp. 193-208). See also Harold Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968, pages 57, 58, and 67.)
Labels:
H.R. McMaster,
Harold Ford,
Sigma Games,
Thomas Allen,
Wargames
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Moral dilemmas , gaming, and the Kobayashi Maru
Rex Brynen at PaxSims has an interesting post up wondering whether it would be helpful to provide training to peacekeepers in the form of Kobayashi Maru-like scenarios (scenarios for which there is no "good" answer, no way to win, and no way to avoid a severe negative outcome), as a way of preparing them for the wrenching moral choices they might encounter in the course of their work:
This got me back to thinking about the potential role of gaming in preparing participants for difficult moral challenges by means of acclimating them to decision-making in that sort of environment (something I looked at a bit in my thesis). In their 1977 book, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment, Irving Janis and Leon Mann described a similar phenomenon they called "outcome psychodrama," which would involve a sort of "emotional inoculation" for decision-makers ahead of time to better prepare them for the emotional states they might experience under a decision-making situation. They believed that gaming might be a particularly appropriate tool for outcome psychodrama "[f]or group discussions whose consequences are highly dependent upon the reactions and countermoves of other people." In contrast to the way most games are run, Janis and Mann suggested running the similar scenarios multiple times with the same participants, examining likely, favorable, and worst case results for each of the available alternatives.
As an example of the danger in ignoring the emotional factors in decision-making, consider Bernard Brodie’s description of the U.S. decision to defend South Korea in 1950 after having announced that it outside the U.S. defensive perimeter in the region just months earlier:
Science fiction fans will immediately recognize this as a reference to a Starfleet training simulation featured in the movie Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. In the Kobyashi Maru scenario, trainees were faced with impossible choices in an unwinnable situation: did they answer a distress call from a damaged frieghter, only to find their ship destroyed? Or did they ignore the call, only to see the freighter destroyed? It was meant to be a test of character, and an evaluation of how would-be officers confronted such dilemmas.
Now, readers who haven’t the slightest interest in Star Trek needn’t worry that this blog post will slip into excessive Trekkism. Rather, it occurs to me that there may be some value in designing peacebuilding/humanitarian assistance operations in which participants are confronted with situations that truly have no good answers. I mean this, moreover, not simply in that they face resource shortages and hence opportunity costs associated with actions (something that the Carena simulation does very well), but rather that no matter what they do, they are forced to confront gut-wrenching moral choices.…and so forth. The point would be not so much which particular choice was made, but how it was made—providing an opportunity for participants to reflect on the the moral and practical calculus involved.
- Does one—for example—pull humanitarian workers out of a dangerous area, knowing locals will die? Or does one keep them there, knowing that no matter what security precautions are taken there is a significant risk of staff being killed?
- Do you authorize an airstrike against a high-value insurgent leader, knowing that there is a near-certainty of significant civilian casualties?
- Do you pay “taxes” to a local militia to enable access to a needy population—knowing that the doing so strengthens their capacity to engage in such predatory activities?
- Do peacekeepers fight in to protect civilians from massacre, even if they believe they lack the capability to win and might thereby be slaughtered as well? (Yes, I’m thinking here of Srebrenica, although it could equally be applied to some of the choices that MONUC has made in DR Congo.)
This got me back to thinking about the potential role of gaming in preparing participants for difficult moral challenges by means of acclimating them to decision-making in that sort of environment (something I looked at a bit in my thesis). In their 1977 book, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment, Irving Janis and Leon Mann described a similar phenomenon they called "outcome psychodrama," which would involve a sort of "emotional inoculation" for decision-makers ahead of time to better prepare them for the emotional states they might experience under a decision-making situation. They believed that gaming might be a particularly appropriate tool for outcome psychodrama "[f]or group discussions whose consequences are highly dependent upon the reactions and countermoves of other people." In contrast to the way most games are run, Janis and Mann suggested running the similar scenarios multiple times with the same participants, examining likely, favorable, and worst case results for each of the available alternatives.
As an example of the danger in ignoring the emotional factors in decision-making, consider Bernard Brodie’s description of the U.S. decision to defend South Korea in 1950 after having announced that it outside the U.S. defensive perimeter in the region just months earlier:
“President Truman and his Secretary of State had endorsed the well-known and obviously rational opposition of the military to becoming involved on mainland Asia. When the crisis came, all, including the military, immediately reversed their position. Apparently few had asked themselves: How will we feel, and how will we in consequence respond, if there is a flagrant attack upon this state and this government that we have ourselves set up and all but recently withdrawn from on the now disproved assumption that they were no longer in danger? Will we really stand by and let them go down?” (Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, 60-61)Brodie suggested that this was the result of "the tendency of people in office to use formulae rather than imaginative rumination to in projecting their own behavior into the future." "Imaginative rumination" is something that free-form gaming can offer the opportunity to pursue. This goes further than the Kobayashi Maru no-win scenario, but seems like it could have significant value. I am not aware of games having been built for this purpose, but John Hanley discussed a number of participants from the Global War Game who reported having experienced powerful emotions surounding the sorts of "gut-wrenching moral choices" Rex proposes. In the Global War Game, these often revolved around the use of nuclear weapons. Hanley mentioned some participants reporting that "[e]ven simulated momentous decisions cost them some sleep."
Labels:
decision science,
Irving Janis,
John Hanley,
Leon Mann,
PaxSims,
Rex Brynen
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
New gaming blog, new article on NDU's gaming center
Rex Brynen and Gary Milante recently started PaxSims, a great new blog, "devoted to the development and implementation of peace and conflict simulations for education and training purposes." It's well worth checking out, and they are posting frequently.
Their most recent post is on a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the National Strategic Gaming Center at NDU. There's some great stuff about a new initiative by the NSGC to get the various gaming shops to engage more with each other and with the broader policy community with regards to gaming methodology. I wrote about a previous JFQ article on the NSGC here.
Their most recent post is on a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the National Strategic Gaming Center at NDU. There's some great stuff about a new initiative by the NSGC to get the various gaming shops to engage more with each other and with the broader policy community with regards to gaming methodology. I wrote about a previous JFQ article on the NSGC here.
Monday, August 4, 2008
Nuclear War: Iran vs. Israel
This report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is not strictly speaking a game report, but rather "the material used in a scenario analysis and interactive game that looks at some of the consequences of a future nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran, and the possible impact of its expansion to cover targets in Syria, Egypt, and the Gulf." Unfortunately, I can't find any details on the "interactive game," but the background materials are comprehensive and fascinating (if you're into nuclear weapons). The results from their analysis are presented as a quote from the movie Wargames: the only way to win is not to play. If anyone knows where I could find details about the "interactive game" they conducted, I would love to learn more about it.
Friday, July 25, 2008
Wargaming Fourth-Generation Warfare
I am slowly making my way through the papers available at the website of the Center for Naval Analyses (previously mentioned here). Wargaming Fourth-Generation Warfare is another excellent resource from their archives. Though it deals with more operational concerns than most of the games I focus on here, the concepts that it lays out to address the issue of fourth-generation warfare are applicable to any structure of game.
The paper includes a fairly full description of the development of the idea of fourth-generation warfare as a way of distinguishing the way armed conflict occurs in the modern world from previous kinds of war (e.g., Napoleonic, WW1, WW2). This is the sort of thing that one hears a lot about in security studies, but perhaps not as much elsewhere. Regardless, at its core, fourth-generation warfare is a way to think about the way changes in technology and the phenomenon of globalization, among other factors, have fundamentally altered the environment in which conflict takes place. In a broad sense, this shift is relevant to disciplines far removed from security studies, which makes this paper useful outside of the military or political-military context.
Some of the hallmarks of fourth-generation warfare are the increased importance of non-state actors (clans, terrorist organizations, corporations, criminal organizations, etc.), a related loss of the nation-state's presumed monopoly on violence, and a diminution of traditional distinctions between combatant and non-combatant. The paper describes these shifts in terms of increased asymmetries of worldview, purpose, actions, and means between the relevant world actors, which is not how I have previously conceptualized fourth-generation warfare, but which sets up a useful framework for considering how to model the phenomenon in a game.
The authors address the basic question of gaming fourth-generation warfare: how do you build a game that integrates vastly different worldviews on the part of the opposing sides? The goals of the various relevant actors might be so diverse that their very perceptions of the "battlefield" might be incompatible. Designing a game in which the setup, goals, and options available to each actor allow (and encourage) the expression of each actor's distinct worldview is a huge challenge. As the authors suggest, it basically means designing multiple games, each from the perspective of one of the actors, and finding a way to accommodate or merge them together.
This is a fascinating paper. Presumably there has been more research along these lines at CNA and the Naval War College, since fourth-generation warfare appears to be here to stay, and with it the thorny problems of designing games with it in mind.
The paper includes a fairly full description of the development of the idea of fourth-generation warfare as a way of distinguishing the way armed conflict occurs in the modern world from previous kinds of war (e.g., Napoleonic, WW1, WW2). This is the sort of thing that one hears a lot about in security studies, but perhaps not as much elsewhere. Regardless, at its core, fourth-generation warfare is a way to think about the way changes in technology and the phenomenon of globalization, among other factors, have fundamentally altered the environment in which conflict takes place. In a broad sense, this shift is relevant to disciplines far removed from security studies, which makes this paper useful outside of the military or political-military context.
Some of the hallmarks of fourth-generation warfare are the increased importance of non-state actors (clans, terrorist organizations, corporations, criminal organizations, etc.), a related loss of the nation-state's presumed monopoly on violence, and a diminution of traditional distinctions between combatant and non-combatant. The paper describes these shifts in terms of increased asymmetries of worldview, purpose, actions, and means between the relevant world actors, which is not how I have previously conceptualized fourth-generation warfare, but which sets up a useful framework for considering how to model the phenomenon in a game.
The authors address the basic question of gaming fourth-generation warfare: how do you build a game that integrates vastly different worldviews on the part of the opposing sides? The goals of the various relevant actors might be so diverse that their very perceptions of the "battlefield" might be incompatible. Designing a game in which the setup, goals, and options available to each actor allow (and encourage) the expression of each actor's distinct worldview is a huge challenge. As the authors suggest, it basically means designing multiple games, each from the perspective of one of the actors, and finding a way to accommodate or merge them together.
This is a fascinating paper. Presumably there has been more research along these lines at CNA and the Naval War College, since fourth-generation warfare appears to be here to stay, and with it the thorny problems of designing games with it in mind.
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Virtual environment for distributed seminar-style wargames
Wired's defense blog, the Danger Room, has an interesting post about the Army wanting a virtual reality space for conducting distributed seminar-style wargames (where participants are not in the same geographic location) to complement its collection of training video games:
It's unclear from the post whether the actual conduct and structure of the game would change much, but if this makes strategic-level gaming more accessible or the necessary suspension of disbelief easier to achieve, that could be a big step forward for this sort of distributed game.
What's missing, according to Major Kyle Burley, a staffer at the Army War College, is a game that simulates decision-making at strategic levels -– something to help make better generals. He calls it "a first-person thinker."
Today Burley uses a moderated, text-based game that simulates top command during an imaginary Second Korean War. Essentially, the game is just a series of chat rooms where colonels hash out potential command decisions, and a moderator decides whether they’re good decisions or not. What Burley wants is an "immersive" game with a live 3D environment and avatars for the players. "Ideally, we would have a virtual, online, Web-access roleplaying environment which allows students to be an avatar [that] probably looks much like the student, and they're given a skin like in Second Life that is equivalent to their position, and they go into different moderated rooms and talk to fellow roleplayers that are in that scenario."
It's unclear from the post whether the actual conduct and structure of the game would change much, but if this makes strategic-level gaming more accessible or the necessary suspension of disbelief easier to achieve, that could be a big step forward for this sort of distributed game.
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